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DOES ETHICS NEED GOD?
Linda Zagzebski

ntis essay presents a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If all I have
to go on morally are my own moral intuitions and reasoning and those of others, I am
rationally led to skepticism, both about the possibility of moral knowledge and about my
moral effectiveness. This skepticism is extensive, amounting to moral despair. But such
despair cannot be rational. It follows that the assumption of the argument must be false
and I must be able to rely on more than my own human powers and those of others in
attempting to live a moral life. The Christian God has such a function. Hence, if it is
rational to attempt a moral life, it is rational to believe in the Christian God.

Whenever anyone begins a study of ethics, a natural question to ask is why
should we undertake such a study at all. I am satisfied with the answer that
ethics teaches us how to be moral and anyone who understands what morality
is will thereby want to live by it, just as anyone who understands the meaning
of an analytic proposition will thereby see its truth. But wanting to be moral, I
believe, is not sufficient to justify either the study of ethics or the attempt to
practice morality. The question, "Should I try to be moral?" is not the same as
the classic question, "Why be moral?" The latter question is sufficiently answered
by the response that morality is its own justification. Morality aims at the good
and anyone who understands what good means will see that its pursuit is justified.
It is much harder, though, to answer the question, "Should I try to be moral?"
This is because there is no point in trying to do something I cannot do. It is not
enough to know that morality is intrinsically worthy of pursuit. There is simply
no reason for me to pursue something unless I have good reason to think that I
am capable of pursuing it successfully. So it is not rational to attempt to lead a
moral life without a strong response to the fear of moral impotence, a fear which,
I will argue, is rationally motivated and not easy to meet. In this paper I will
attempt to show that it is not rational to try to be moral unless it is rational to
believe that the attempt has a reasonable chance for success. But it is not rational
to believe success is reasonably likely unless one believes there is a factor which
explains how. A providential God is such a factor. Since it is rational to try to
be moral, it is rational to believe in a providential God.
One source of the fear of attempting to lead a moral life is the vague suspicion
that the whole enterprise is futile. To see what generates this fear we ought to
look at what the point of morality and moral studies is. It is, clearly, a practical
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one, and in this respect the study of ethics is quite different from other academic
studies and even other branches of philosophy. The point is not simply to know
certain things, to satisfy one's intellectual curiosity; it is not even to become
wise. The purpose is to produce good and to prevent evil and to make oneself
into a virtuous person. Of course, most philosophers have pointed out the practical
end of ethics, though some have thought it exhausted in the doing of right acts
and the avoidance of wrong acts or in the attainment of happiness. It seems to
me that in producing good and avoiding evil I am primarily aiming at producing
something independent of myself, so morality is not just practical, but creative.
In this way it is like art. Art also aims at producing something independent of
oneself, though it is creations of beauty rather than creations of good. But while
almost anybody would agree that art is worthy of pursuit, some individual might
reasonably conclude that there is no point in her trying to pursue it if she doubts
her ability to do it successfully. The same point applies to a host of other
worthwhile activities-Olympic-level gymnastics, a career as a solo cellist,
finding a cure for leukemia--each is obviously worth doing, but knowing that
it is worth doing is not sufficient to provide me with a rational motivation for
attempting it, even if I want to do it very much. Similarly, it is not enough for
me to know that morality is worthwhile in order for me to see the point in trying
to pursue it myself. I need some assurance that my chances of success are not
too remote.
The problem is intensified when we realize that the moral life involves more
than time and effort. At least some of the time it involves the sacrifice of
self-interest. It is not rational, however, to give up a known good unless it is
probable that the sacrifice really is for a greater good. This means that I need
assurance on several counts. First, I need confidence that I can have moral
knowledge. That is, I need good reasons to believe that my individual moral
judgments, both about obligations and about values, are correct. Second, I need
confidence in my moral efficacy, both in the sense that I can overcome moral
weakness, and in the sense that I have the causal power to being about good in
the world. Third, in so far as many moral goals require cooperation, I need
confidence in the moral knowledge and moral efficacy of other people.
The argument I will present can be cast in the form of a reductio ad absurdum.
If all I have to go on morally is my own moral intuitions and reasoning and the
intuitions and reasoning of others, then I am rationally led to skepticism about
the possibility of moral knowledge. Furthermore, my experience and that of
others leads me to be skeptical of a person's ability to follow moral beliefs. In
addition, it is rational to be skeptical of human moral power in the sense that
we can, by acting individually and collectively, bring about good and prevent
evil in the world. The assumption of this argument therefore leads me to a very
extensive moral skepticism, amounting actually to moral despair. But such despair
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cannot be rational. Therefore, the assumption of the argument must be false and
I must be able to rely on more than my own human powers and those of others
in attempting to live a moral life.
The first step of the argument is that a considered use of my moral and
perceptual faculties and reasoning leads me to be skeptical of the possibility of
attaining moral knowledge using these faculties alone. This skepticism is, I think,
the most rational and fair-minded response to moral pluralism. I am not denying
that there are many cases of moral agreement, even cross-culturally. Moral
agreements typically involve general principles about the promotion of certain
goods and the prevention of certain evils where no conflicts with other values
arise. So almost anybody anywhere would accept a principle prohibiting the
infliction of gratuitous suffering, or a principle advocating the acquisition of
knowledge when no other good need be sacrificed. But when it is said that we
ought to join the moral endeavor, this is not taken to mean that we ought to
limit our efforts to the noncontroversial cases. Our efforts are in fact required
in the large areas in which there is considerable controversy.
In almost every area of morality it is a common human experience to find
that people make very different moral judgments. The differences arise at every
level of belief-at the level of judging the rightness or wrongness of particular
acts, at the level of general principles of obligation, at the level of basic moral
values, at the metaethical level. In some cases these differences are resolvable.
Some are due to differences in beliefs about circumstances or causal relationships.
So a moral disagreement about withholding medical treatment might reduce to
a disagreement about a patient's chances of recovery, or a disagreement about
some method of famine relief might tum on the question of whether it would
cause more famine later. Another kind of resolvable moral difference arises when
one party to the dispute makes a fallacious inference in reasoning. Since a part
of reasoning has been codified into fairly clear and commonly-accepted rules,
disputes involving the violation of one of these rules should be easy to resolve.
Still another kind of difference is one in which one disputant is lacking in
sensitivity to a basic value. Some people may be incapable of appreciating a
particular good and some of the time this can be detected. Perhaps he does not
put much value in beauty or knowledge or love. We think of such a person as
having a cognitive or emotional defect, and at least some of the time we may
even reach general agreement on such a judgment.
All these cases, though resolvable, are rather uninteresting, and perhaps they
are uninteresting precisely because they are resolvable. The really interesting
cases of moral disputes are those which fall under none of these categories. They
are disputes which cannot be blamed on factual error or error in logic or insensitivity to value. These are the cases that are not rationally decidable. This is
not to say that in such cases no error in reasoning has been made, nor is it to
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say that no mistake has been made in the detection of value. What I am claiming
is that there are cases in which we have no non-question-begging procedure for
deciding where the error lies. Whenever I find significant disagreement with one
of my moral judgments I could, of course, simply claim that the people who
disagree with me are irrational or insensitive to good and evil, or have made
some factual error, or any combination of these defects. But if I am honest,
shouldn't I admit that I have no right to use correspondence with what seems
to me to be rational and intuitively correct as a way of deciding the trustworthiness
of others when my own trustworthiness is presumably also open to question?
Descartes remarks in the opening lines of the Discourse on Method that good
sense must be more equally distributed than anything else since everyone is
content with his share. It seems true that each person is content with his share
of good judgment, in moral as well as in non-moral matters, but I do not see
that it follows that such judgment is equally shared by all. People not so well
endowed with practical wisdom might not be aware of their limitations. In fact,
I suspect they usually are not. This is because the lack of practical wisdom
involves the inability to judge character and moral ability, including one's own.
So if I were lacking in the ability to make good moral judgments, I would not
know it. How am I, then, to know that I am one of the luckier, more morally
gifted ones? On the other hand, suppose Descartes' point is right and good
judgment in moral matters really is equally distributed among people. Again
many moral differences would be irresolvable. So regardless of the way good
moral judgment is distributed among people, some moral disputes are undecidable. Either they are undecidable because such judgment is equal and so no one
person's judgment counts more than another;s, or they are undecidable because
such judgment is unequal, but there is no non-question-begging procedure I can
use to determine who has the better judgment. I conclude that in cases in which
there is considerable moral disagreement which cannot be resolved by a commonly-accepted procedure, I ought to mistrust the judgments on both sides of
the dispute, including my own.
The skepticism I am talking about is extensive and drastic, not the innocuous
amount of skepticism that is healthy and no doubt required by intellectual honesty
and modesty. To see how serious the problem is, we should address two further
questions: (1) How widespread are the disagreements of the kind I have called
undecidable, and (2) How strong a doubt should a rational person adopt as the
result of these disagreements? The answer to both questions, I think, is that it
is considerable.
To take the first question first, what reasons do we have to think that undecidable
moral disagreements are widespread? It is obvious that there are very many
moral disagreements. It is probably almost as obvious that in very many cases
these disagreements have not been resolved to the satisfaction of most interested,
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rational people. But, of course, the fact that so many moral disagreements remain
unresolved does not entail that they are unresolvable. Philosophers and others
spend a lot of effort at attempting to resolve such disputes. Surely they must
think it is possible to settle these matters; otherwise, they would not attempt it.
If I am right, wouldn't this make most professional ethics, as well as most moral
deliberation, misguided? Since the point of my argument in this paper is to save
moral reasoning and action from being misguided, I do want to say that the
reliance on our human faculties is not sufficient to save it from hopeless skepticism. However, an activity can be saved from hopelessness by something about
which some of its practitioners are unaware. I am attempting to give a moral
argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If I am right, then God's existence
makes the moral life rational. God's existence does this whether the people who
deliberate about and attempt to live a moral life know it or not.
Let us now consider the second question. Why should the fact that there are
very many moral issues which are undecidable lead to such extreme skepticism?
Perhaps a person could admit that many moral disputes are undecidable, but
instead of concluding that such disputes have no resolution which has been
adequately shown to be rational enough to support action, he might conclude
instead that they're all rationally justified, or, at least, that many of them are. I
This position seems reasonable when applied to disagreements about such things
as scientific or historical theories, where one has little or nothing to lose if one
is wrong, but it seems extremely implausible when applied to morality. It would
be very odd to tell a woman contemplating an abortion that her position is
rationally justified and that she ought to go ahead and act on it, but add that the
contrary position is equally justified. I would think such information would be
unhelpful in the extreme and would no doubt give her no motivation to act one
way or the other.
Another way we might consider avoiding the consequence of accepting despair
from this skeptical argument is to embrace a more benign form of skepticism
such as that of David Hume. This type of skepticism does not have any practical
effect on the way one lives one's life, nor even on one's tendency to acquire
and keep beliefs. Hume argues, for example, for skepticism about the existence
of enduring physical objects, the existence of an enduring self, and the justification
of induction. However, he admits that his skepticism has no effect on our tendency
to believe in the existence of enduring objects and a self or to make inductive
inferences. When he says these beliefs are not rationally justified, he does not
mean that we ought not to believe them. This is because it cannot be the case
that we ought not to do something we cannot help doing, and Hume says we
cannot help having these beliefs. My moral case is quite different, however. We
have a strong natural motivation to be moral, but unlike Humean doubt, moral
beliefs are very vulnerable to the doubt I have described, and it is not true that
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we cannot help having them. Skepticism does not take away the natural desire
to be moral, but it does take away the motivating force because morality is
intimately connected with feelings, commitments, sacrifices, expectations, and
hopes. The moral life involves risk, both because of the personal sacrifices it
requires and because of the emotional commitment it involves. This makes it
very vulnerable to skepticism; hence, the despair.
The argument that moral pluralism rationally leads to moral skepticism depends
in part on the assumption that the acquisition of knowledge is social. Though I
do not intend to defend it in this paper, this assumption seems to me to be true
and to be applicable to knowledge in the moral sphere. We learn the meaning
and application of moral terms socially; we have our moral sensitivities socially
educated; we learn the trustworthiness of our moral reasoning, as we do all other
forms of reasoning, by the responses of others; and we learn the validity of those
perceptual and other factual beliefs which we use in making specific moral
judgments by comparing them with the judgments of others. This is not to say,
of course, that the reasoning and judgments of others are always the last word,
but it is to say that they must be taken into account and the reliability of our
own moral judgments is significantly weakened when they conflict with those
of others. They are, at least, unless we have some reasonable explanation of the
conflict which settles the disagreement in our favor.
So far I have argued that if all we have to go on in moral deliberation is our
human faculties, then the existence of moral pluralism makes many moral disagreements undecidable and this ought to lead us rationally into an extensive
skepticism about moral knowledge. The skepticism we are rationally led to,
though, is not limited to knowledge of moral truths. If we are rational, we must
also doubt our moral efficacy. In the first place, the predominance of moral
weakness ought to lead us to lack trust in our own moral powers and those of
others. Furthermore, even when moral weakness is not a problem, there is good
reason to doubt our moral efficacy in the sense of our causal power over good
and evil. People have been struggling to promote good and to prevent evil for
as long as people have had a moral sense at all, but is there good evidence that
good is increasing and evil decreasing? Even when good is produced or evil
eliminated, do we have good reason to think that it is usually the result of a
conscious, morally-motivated human choice? Of course, some of the time it
probably is, but if I impartially consider the probability that on any given occasion
I can, by my efforts, produce good or eliminate evil, would I calculate that the
probability is sufficiently great to be worth the emotional risk and personal
sacrifice of making the effort? If I were certain that my judgment about what is
good and how to attain it were true, the doubt about my moral efficacy might
still leave it rational to act on my moral judgment and take the risk of being
ineffective. But when doubt about the judgment itself is added to doubt about
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my ability to act on it effectively, the result is a very serious degree of skepticism,
making it irrational in many cases to accept the sacrifices of attempting to be
moral.
In deciding whether or not to attempt a moral life, I must weigh the probability
that a certain quantity of good will be produced by my efforts against the
probability that a sacrifice of a certain quantity of good will result.
Let i = the increase in the probability that a good will obtain as a result of
my efforts.
s = the probability that my efforts will result in a sacrifice of certain lesser goods.
Vi == the value of the good I might produce by attempting a moral life.
V2 == the value of the good I would sacrifice.
We could then calculate the expected value of the attempt to be moral as:
VM (value of moral effort) = i x Vi - S X V2.
It should be recognized that part of the value Vi will be internal goods which
accrue to me simply in virtue of my efforts at being moral. The probability that
this part of Vi will obtain may be very high. However, I have argued that the
value i, which is the overall probability that I can produce Vi, might be so much
lower than the probability value s, it could easily happen that the value VM is
negative, even though we would expect Vi to be much greater than V2 •
I have argued that if all we have to go on morally are our human faculties,
then we are rationally led to extensive moral skepticism, both about the possibility
of moral knowledge and about moral efficacy. If one's actions are consistent
with one's beliefs such skepticism would have a devastating effect on the attempt
to lead a moral life. It rationally leads to moral despair. But moral despair cannot
be rational since we know the attempt to lead a moral life is rational. The
assumption of the argument, that our human faculties alone make the rational
attempt to practice morality possible, must therefore be false.
This argument is, as I have pointed out, a kind of reductio ad absurdum. It
is not, however, a reductio in the usual logician's sense of a reduction to a
logical contradiction. The absurdity is of a different kind. Total and unrelenting
moral despair, I presume, is an absurd state. It cannot be rational to be in such
a state, though I do not intend to argue for this. There may be people influenced
by some aspects of existentialism. who believe that life is absurd and simply
accept it. This paper is not intended for those people. It is intended for those
people who believe that if life is truly absurd, it ought not to be lived. Since it
ought to be lived, it must not be absurd. I am assuming that nihilism is neither
natural nor rationaI-, and in spite of Nietzsche, it is certainly not comforting.
In the famous essay, "A Free Man's Worship," Bertrand Russell attempted
to exalt human life on a foundation of moral despair by endowing it with the
beauty of tragedy. He thought the right attitude toward the moral history of the
universe is complete resignation, but the morally sensitive person with sufficient
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imagination can find all the motivation he needs to live a morally worthy life
in the purely aesthetic qualities of such a life, and in this there is a kind of
freedom. That there are people who can find sufficient motivation to live in such
a manner may be possible, but whether it is rational or even praiseworthy to
give up lesser goods in what is thought to be a vain attempt to obtain greater
goods is dubious, even if the attempt itself is beautiful.
If moral despair is irrational, then we must be able to trust more than our own
human faculties of perception, reasoning and intuition in attempting to lead a
moral life. What kind of trust do we need in order to avoid such despair? I
argued that skepticism faces us at several points in attempting to be moral. First,
there is skepticism about the possibility of attaining moral knowledge. In
attempting to live morally we need trust that there is something beyond our
human cognitive and moral faculties which can provide guidance in knowing
moral truth. The Christian God has such a function. Second, I argued that there
is skepticism about moral efficacy in the sense of moral weakness. This suggests
that the attempt to lead a moral life requires trust in something that can help us
overcome such weakness. The Christian notion of grace serves such a function.
Third, there is skepticism about moral causal power, both my own and that of
others. 'This means that the attempt to live morally requires trust that the ultimate
goal of morality can be reached, that good can be created and preserved and
evil can be prevented or eliminated, in spite of the fact that people differ greatly
in their moral judgments and often seem to be acting at cross-purposes. The
Christian notion of divine providence serves this requirement for the moral life.
I conclude that it is only rational to do ethics and attempt to lead a moral life
if there is something we can trust which will save us from these three forms of
moral skepticism. I have not argued that the Christian God is the only thing that
can serve the need for trust in living the moral life, but the Christian God does
serve these needs. It is therefore more rational for a person who believes in the
rationality of the attempt to live morally to believe in such a God than not to
believe in anything in which she can put such trust.
The argument can be summarized as follows: It is not rational to try to be
moral unless it is rational to believe the attempt likely to be successful. At least,
the likelihood of its success must not be outweighed by the sacrifices such an
attempt entails. But it is not rational to believe such an attempt likely to be
successful if all we have to go on in the moral life are our own faculties. This
is because those faculties rationally lead us to extensive skepticism both about
moral knowledge and about moral efficacy. Since it is rational to try to be moral,
we must have more to go on in the moral life than our own human faculties. In
particular, the possibility of success in the moral life requires something which
enables us to get out of skepticism. The Christian God has such a function.
An objector might say that though the Christian concepts of grace and provi-
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dence are adequate to forestall skepticism about moral efficacy, how does the
existence of God prevent skepticism about moral knowledge? Isn't the theist as
much faced with the problem of moral pluralism as is the non-theist? In response,
it seems to me that it is certainly true that the theist is faced with a certain
amount of skepticism about his own particular moral judgments. Theism does
not guarantee the possession of moral truth to the believer. However, the theist
has a better way of dealing with the problem of moral pluralism than the non-theist
in two ways. First, the theist has another source of moral knowledge in divine
revelation and the teachings of the Church, and second, the theist's trust in divine
providence gives him reason to believe in moral progress, not only with respect
to moral efficacy, but also with respect to moral knowledge. This is not to
suggest that the theist has no problems with doubt about the interpretation of
God's will. Such a suggestion would be naive. But again, the Christian concept
of providence provides confidence that these problems are resolvable.
There is one more way in which my conclusion might be blocked. It might
be agreed that the assumption of my argument rationally leads to despair, that
such despair is not rational, and that therefore it is rational to have trust in
attempting to be moral. But perhaps the human need for trust is its own justification; it is not necessary to bring in the existence of a providential God to
justify it. If the human need for trust is strong enough, it might outweigh the
skepticism I have defended. We might call this the alternative of blind trust, or
trust out of the sheer need to avoid despair. Such trust would be, I think, more
rational than despair, but some trust can be more rational than others, and the
trust I have defended is a trust with a set of beliefs which explains its rationality.
This seems to be far more rational than blind trust.
In this paper I have given a moral argument for the rationality of belief in the
Christian God. I have assumed that it is rational to try to be moral, but given
certain problems in the moral life, it is not rational unless certain conditions
obtain-those conditions which free a person from the three forms of skepticism
I have discussed. The argument is Kantian in its general structure since, like
Kant, the claim is that moral endeavor presupposes the existence of something
like God as a condition for the rational possibility of its achievement. Theistic
belief is, therefore, justified in the practical domain of reason. I have not argued,
though, that belief in the Christian God is the only conceivable way to provide
the conditions necessary for making moral effort rational, but it has no competitors
that I know of. It follows that the theist is acting more rationally than the
non-theist when they both act on their moral beliefs and claim that those beliefs
are: justified. Since most non-theists do not hesitate to do this, it follows that it
would be more rational for them to believe in God than not to.
Loyola Marymount University
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NOTE
1. This seems to be the position of Richard W. Miller in "Ways of Moral Learning," Philosophical
Review XCIV, 4, (October 1985). See esp. pp. 507-509, 548-556, and fn. 33, p. 539.

